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Abstract 
Corporate governance is relevant in both developed and emerging economies. The study viewed 
corporate governance as a risk management tool for enhancing organisations performance and 
protection of stakeholders’ interest. The study investigated the impact of corporate governance 
on organizational performance, using thirty (30) Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) listed companies 
in 2016. The study focused on three corporate governance variables (i.e., Board Size, Board 
Independence, CEO Duality/Tenure); and two performance variables - Returns on Asset (ROA) 
and Returns on Equity (ROE). Secondary data, extracted from published annual reports of 
selected companies and NSE website, was used for the study. The findings revealed a positive 
correlation between board size, independence directors, and performance variables; but, showed 
a negative correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables. The results showed that 
the number of directors was not positively related to performance in terms of ROA; but, it 
revealed a positive correlation between board size and performance in terms of ROE. It revealed 
that the correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables (ROA and ROE) was 
negative. It also showed that CEO Duality has a positive correlation with ROA, and negative 
relationship with ROE. The findings revealed that adoption of sound corporate governance 
practices by listed companies can improve their performances. The underlining conclusion is that 
organisations would benefit from sound corporate governance practices by way of increased 
investment from investors and reduced capital cost. Shareholders confidence and wealth will also 
be improved; and the nation’s economy will benefit by way of improved GDP. 
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Introduction 
The subject of corporate governance is relevant in both developed and emerging economies. Its 
importance stems from the need to protect shareholders’ investments and interest, especially after the 
collapse of large organisations including WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco (Buckley and Arner 2012; Coskun, 
2012; Daianu and Lungu, 2008). Corporate governance practices are based on trust and accountability 
(Adekoya, 2014; Todorovic, 2013; Chen, Dar-Hsin and Chung, 2006). However, corporate governance 
practices differ among developed and emerging countries. This is because economic and political 
environments of developed and emerging economies are not the same (Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 
2012; Li, Li and Shapiro, 2012). Whereas developed economies are characterized by strong institutions, 
functional infrastructures, and stable political environment; while, emerging economies are known for 
infrastructural deficits, weak institutions, and relatively unstable political environments (Roberts, Kayande 
and Srivastava, 2015; Ramamurti, 2012; Sheth, 2011). Nigeria is a developing country because the 
nation’s economy is sustained by mono-product (oil), whose price is determined by the forces of demand 
and supply in the international oil market. There is also huge infrastructural deficit and large-scale 
unemployment with weak institutions. The study viewed corporate governance as a risk management tool 
for enhancing organisations performance and protection of stakeholders’ interest. Hence, it is essential for 
Nigerian listed firms to embrace sound corporate governance to protect stakeholders’ interest. This is 
necessary considering the role of stock market development in economic growth (Adenuga, 2010; 
Boubakari and Jin, 2010).  
The aim of the study is to analyse the impact of corporate governance practices on organisational 
performance, using selected listed companies in the Nigeria Stock Exchange in the year 2016. The study 
focused on thirty randomly selected listed companies across ten sectors of the Nigerian stock exchange in 
the year 2016. These sectors are Agriculture, Conglomerates, Consumer goods, Financial Services, 
Healthcare, ICT, Industrial goods, Natural resources, Oil and Gas, and Services (Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Official Website). The study focused on three corporate governance variables (i.e., Board Size, Board 
Independence, CEO Duality/Tenure) and two performance variables (i.e., Returns on Asset and Returns on 
Equity). The study does not cover the market measure performance variable of Tobin’s Q. 
The following research hypotheses are formulated for the study: 
Hypothesis One: 
Ho: Board independence is not positively related to performance of companies in Nigeria. 
H1: Board independence is positively related to performance of companies in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis Two: 
Ho: Chief Executive Officer’s tenure is negatively related to organisational performance. 
H1: Chief Executive Officer’s tenure is positively related to organisational performance. 
Hypothesis Three: 
Ho: There is no positive relationship between performance of companies’ and dual role of Chief Executive 
Officers in Nigeria. 
H1: There is positive relationship between performance of companies’ and dual role of Chief Executive 
Officers in Nigeria. 
Having introduced the study, the remaining part of the paper is divided into four (4) sections focusing on 
literature review; methodology; data analysis and discussion of results; and conclusions. 
Literature Review  
Financial scandals involving some organisations across the globe have shown how some managers 
mismanaged organisational resources to the detriment of shareholders, thereby resulting to huge losses 
and negative corporate image to those organisations (Buckley and Arner, 2012; Shahrokhi, 2011; Prasad, 
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2009). This study explored the effect of corporate governance on organisation performance in relation to 
organisations internal mechanisms including: board size, independent directors’ composition, and chief 
executive officer duality role. In this section, the literature is reviewed on: importance of corporate 
governance; corporate governance development in Nigerian organisations; corporate governance legal 
framework in Nigeria; relationship between corporate governance and organisational performance; 
measurement of corporate governance and organisational performance; and international perspective on 
corporate governance and organisational performance. 
Importance of corporate governance 
The study is important in view of increase in organisational failures globally, including Nigeria. In Nigeria, 
the failure of some big corporate organisations like Intercontinental Bank, Savannah Bank and the financial 
scandal in Cadbury (Nigeria) shocked the Nigerian corporate landscape that necessitated the review of 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria. The importance of good corporate governance in developing 
economies, like Nigeria, can be assessed based on performance of companies in those countries. 
Companies can derive several benefits from adoption and implementation of good corporate governance 
policies (Ahmed and Hamadan, 2015; Akinkoye and Olassanmi, 2014; Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Babatunde 
and Olaniran, 2009). Calabrese, Costa, Menichini, Rosati and Santelice (2013) emphasised that 
organisations with sound corporate governance mechanisms easily accesses capital at a lower rate than 
their contemporaries without sound governance policies. However, benefits derivable from corporate 
governance policies by firms depend on the robustness of their governance policies and its implementation 
(International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2004). Likewise, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2007) argues that 
successful implementation of sound corporate governance by firms can significantly lower financial frictions 
and has a direct effect on the socio-economic perception of the organisation. It has also been established 
that organisations which adopt sound corporate governance practices can reduce labour unrest and 
promote cordial relationship with stakeholders (Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy, 2016; Alalade, Onadeko and 
Okezie, 2014; Akingunola, Adekunle and Adedipe, 2013).  
Nigeria is endowed with abundant human and mineral resources, with a large population and market. As 
one of the developing economies in Africa, Nigeria has a thriving stock exchange market where quoted 
stocks are listed and traded. Quality corporate governance policies can assist to improve the level of 
confidence in the banking sub-sector in Nigeria, thereby impacting positively on the nations’ economic 
development (Afolabi and Amupitan, 2015; Garuba, 2015). Similarly, the Nigerian thriving stock exchange 
market has witnessed several transformations to promote good corporate governance in the market. One 
of such efforts was the introduction of a code to govern policies and ensure best practices by companies in 
2003 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which regulate the operations of quoted 
companies in the Nigerian stock market (SEC, 2003). The SEC also launched new codes in 2011 to 
enhance the governance regime of firms operating in the Nigeria stock exchange aimed at stemming the 
tide of corporate failures (SEC, 2011). Agency theory is a relevant theory in corporate governance 
practices; hence, agency theory is discussed in the next subsection. 
Agency theory 
Agency theory is relevant in analysing ‘conflicts of interest between owners (principal) and those managers 
(agents) who act on their own behalf’ (Chen et al., 2006:265). According to Daily, Dalton and Canella 
(2003), the relevance of agency theory in corporate governance practices can be attributed to two concepts 
emphasised that corporate players are managers and shareholders are company’s owners. The concept of 
agency theory arises from the fact that managers run (control) organisations with their expertise 
knowledge, and shareholders (ownership) provide required funds for establishment of companies. Agency 
theory shows the degree of associations regarding conflicts of interests and align associated relationship 
through a well-defined monitoring mechanism (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Eisenhardt 
(1989) identified two major types of agency theories (principal-agent and positivist) to reducing the 
egocentric nature of the agent. Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasised that the agency theory 
recognises the necessity to put in place governance measures to ensure that managers are held 
accountable for their decisions. Agency theory seeks to define the relationship that exists between 
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providers of funds (shareholders) and the company’s manager (fund managers). This relationship involves 
appointment of an agent by the principal, and confer on the agent the power to exercise defined powers 
during his duties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consequently, it is the function of the board to exercise 
control through implied delegation of powers using incentive packages. However, agency conflicts may 
arise if the principal fails to protect the interest of the company’s owner (shareholders) (Jiang and Peng, 
2014; Attig, El Ghoul and Guedhami, 2009). In the next subsection, we discussed corporate governance 
and organisational performance. 
Corporate governance, a risk management tool for enhancing organisational performance 
Risk management entails identification, assessment, controlling and monitoring of risk associated with an 
organisation’s operation to maximise opportunities and minimise threats. Successful firms are able and 
willing to effectively integrate risk management at all levels of management process from strategy to 
success (Fadun, 2013a). The study viewed corporate governance as a risk management tool for enhancing 
organisations performance and protection of stakeholders’ interest. Sound governance policies can 
enhance organisations performance by underplaying misappropriation of shareholders’ funds and 
promoting qualitative decisions by the board of companies. This is because improvement of a firm’s 
performance can enhance a company’s share value in the stock exchange through a sound corporate 
governance (Mallin, 2004; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). Sound corporate governance can eliminate 
exploitation of shareholders by large institutional investors and fund managers leading to enhanced 
organisation performance. Potential investors would obviously be willing to do business with firms which 
are governed by sound policies to reduce their capital cost and enhance performance. Attraction of more 
investors to the stock market will increase economic activities and enhance the growth of the capital 
market, thereby improving the Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP). On the other hand, unsound 
corporate governance practices will scare potential investors due to lack of transparency and poor 
accountability. The implies that optimal management of shareholders’ funds and accountability can 
enhance an organisations performance (Calabrese et al., 2013; Fadun, 2013b; Bakare, 2011). 
Measurement of Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance  
The Nigeria corporate landscape has been characterized by poor internal controls mechanisms and 
corruption. Hence, this study is relevant to the Nigeria corporate environment that is in dire need of 
implementation of sound corporate governance practices. If sound corporate governance regime is 
enthroned in public companies in Nigeria with a better understanding of the working of both the external 
and internal variables by managers, more investors would be encouraged to invest in the Nigeria stock 
exchange market. There are several factors or variables that may impact on an organisation's 
performance. Some of these variables (external factors) are beyond the control of the organisation. There 
are also variables (internal factors) which are internal and within the control of the organisation. These 
variables which are within the control of the organisation (internal factors) can impact its performance 
depending on how they are managed and controlled. Studies conducted by Byrd and Hickman (1992) and 
Weisbach (1988) agree that corporate governance has a positive relationship with organisational 
performance. Conversely, other empirical studies by Bathala and Rao (1995) and Hutchinson (2002) 
reported that there is no relationship between corporate governance and organisational performance. 
These variables (internal variables) are independent variables which include: efficiency of management, 
board size, board independence, and ownership structure. These independent variables are used for the 
study; hence, these variables are briefly explained below:   
Board Size 
The board of directors plays key role in a company’s corporate governance practice (Afolabi, 2015; 
Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011; Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010). An organisation’s performance can 
be affected adversely or positively by the size of its board. There is no consensus from previous studies as 
to what constitute an acceptable board size for optimal performance of a firm. The interplay of politics and 
professionalism are involved in the appointment of directors; and this has made it difficult to ascertain the 
number of directors that is adequate for a firm’s optimal performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that 
a board membership of seven to nine directors is considered appropriate. According to them, this is the 
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range that will ensure better accountability, quicker decision making, and effective coordination (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). Other studies have argued that a large board will provide the needed expertise and skill for 
more effective and robust board oversight which will affect performance positively (Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen, 2008). According to Lipman (2007:312), “it is preferable to have not less than four and not more 
than ten persons on the board of directors”. He argued that too many directors in the board can make 
operation difficult (Lipman, 2007).  
Board Independence 
A board whose membership is balanced between executive and non-executive directors will be imperative 
for the optimal performance of an organisation. An empirical study carried out by Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) reveal that large ratio of non-executive directors have a positive relationship with organisational 
performance. Non-executive directors ensure efficient and independent decisions that result to improved 
performance in line with agency theory concept (Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan, 2004; Higgs, 2003). The ratio 
of different categories of board directors can impact on board’s decision-making, robustness of board 
oversight and its performance. Boards with a greater number of non-executive directors will tend to be 
more independent than those with more executive directors (Faatihah, Syahrina, AbdulHalim and 
Julizaerma, 2016; Dwivedi, 2012). This is because the activity of management and staff can be monitored 
and scrutinized closely by the executive directors, and this tends to bring about familiarities that can affect 
performance (Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria, 2010; Nowak and McCabe, 2008). Non-executive directors play 
vital role by offering quality oversight to management to ensure good decision-making (Ertimur, Ferri and 
Stubben, 2010). 
CEO Duality 
If functions of a board chairman and chief executive officer are carried out by one individual, it can result to 
excessive authority, influence and power being exercised by that individual to the detriment of the 
organisation. This power, if misused, can result in taking decisions which are detrimental to the interest of a 
company’s stakeholders. There is, however, no consensus from empirical studies on CEO duality. The 
efficiency of Board’s oversight will be greatly hindered if excessive executive powers are exercised by one 
person, and this will have a negative effect on performance (Lam and Lee, 2008; Brickley and Jarrell, 
1997). Rechner and Dalton (1991) believe the combination of these two roles will increase the speed of 
decision-making and impact positively on a company’s overall performance. However, Daily and Dalton 
(1992) could not establish any association between corporate performance and CEO duality.  
Tenure of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
The number of years spent in an office as the CEO of an organisation can affect the company’s 
performance, positively or negatively (Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012). The CEO as the head of the 
management team takes actions that can impact on performance of the management team. Meanwhile, 
effective and robust board is necessary to control the influence of the CEO to forestall misuse of power 
which may hurt the interest of shareholders (Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria, 2010; Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2010). If a CEO is sure of a long tenure, he would most likely take decisions that will be 
beneficial to the shareholders in order to protect his name (Lam and Lee, 2008; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994). Long term tenure of a chief executive officer (CEO) can be favorable for an organisation reflecting 
the experience and cordial relationship between the CEO and other stakeholders within and outside the 
organisation (Petra, 2005; Miller, 1999). 
Methodology 
The research methodology adopted for the study is discussed in this section. The study is an empirical 
research, with analytical research design. Secondary data, extracted from published annual reports of thirty 
randomly selected quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
website as at 31st December 2016, is used for the study. These sources of data are reliable and verifiable, 
as the selected companies audited report conform with laid down public companies accounting procedures. 
The study aimed at ascertaining the correlation between selected governance variables and selected 
performance variables of selected companies across ten (10) sectors in the Nigeria Stock Exchange. The 
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sectors and number of companies used are: Agriculture (1 company); Conglomerates (6 companies); 
Consumer goods (9 companies); Financial Services (4 companies); Healthcare (1 company); ICT (1 
company); Industrial Goods (1 company); Natural Resources (1 company); Oil and Gas (4 companies); and 
Services (2 companies). 
Variables Definition 
Two key variables are used for the study: measurement and performance variables. Measurement 
variables consist of board size, board independence, CEO duality and CEO tenure; while performance 
variables are ‘return on assets’ and ‘return on equity’. These variables are described below. 
Measurement  
Board Size: This was represented by the total membership on the board of the listed selected companies 
used for the study. 
Board independence: This is the number of non-executive directors serving on the boards of the selected 
companies used for the study.  
CEO Duality: The role of chief executive officers of selected companies was reviewed to ascertain if 
whether the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman is occupied by a person. 
CEO Tenure: The analysis of the tenure of CEOs of selected companies based on the published reports of 
organisations. Tenure of a CEO represents the number of years a person served as a company’s CEO. 
The mean number of years of all the companies in the sample was computed using the SPSS package.  
Performance Variables  
Return on Assets: This refers to an accounting performance measure based on historical information. It 
reveals to what extent an organisations’ management utilizes its resources to generate income for the 
shareholders. This was determined in the study by dividing ‘net profit’ with ‘total asset’ (i.e., net profit/total 
asset). 
Return on Equity: This is a performance variable that shows the profit realized by an organisation for 
shareholders’ benefit in a given period. This was determined in this study by dividing ‘profit after tax’ with 
‘shareholder’s fund’ (i.e., !"#$%&	($&)"	&(*+,-./,012/.'4	5672) 
The data collected for the study was analysed with descriptive statistics and correlations, using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software. Pearson correlation coefficient was used to test the 
degree of relationship that exists between governance variables which are: board size (B SIZE), board 
Independence (BIND), CEO tenure (CEO TENURE), CEO duality (CEO DUAL), Return on Asset (ROA), 
and Return on Equity (ROE). Having described the variables, their definitions are provided in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table 1: Variables Definition 
S/N VARIABLE MEASUREMENT/CALCULATION 
1 Board Size Board of Directors totals membership 
2 Board Independence Proportion of non-executive Directors to total number of Directors 
on the Board 
3 CEO Duality Performance of Chairman and CEO by one person 
4 CEO Tenure Total number of years served by the CEO in that position 
5 Return on Equity (ROE) Profit after Tax/ Shareholders fund 
6 Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income/ Total Assets 
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Data analysis and discussion of results 
Data used for the study is presented and analysed in this section. Table 2 shows statistics of the 
companies selected for the study. 
 
Table 2: Selected Listed Companies Statistics 
S/N COMPANIES B SIZE BIND CEO 
TENURE 
CEO 
DUAL 
ROA ROE 
1 UAC 8.00 0.63 7.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 
2 AGL 8.00 0.25 6.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
3 CHELLARAM 6.00 0.50 25.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
4 TRANSCORP 9.00 0.67 3.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 
5 SCOA 10.00 0.40 16.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 
6 JOHN HOLT 7.00 0.57 5.00 0.00 0.05 0.18 
7 DANGOTE SUGAR 10.00 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.12 2.14 
8 FLOUR MILLS 14.00 0.70 5.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 
9 GUINESS PLC 12.00 0.67 2.00 0.00 0.07 0.21 
10 HONEY WELL PLC 14.00 0.57 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 
11 MC NICHOLS 6.00 0.67 3.00 1.00 0.04 0.14 
12 NESTLES 9.00 0.47 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 
13 FORTE OIL PLC 8.00 0.13 7.00 0.00 0.03 0.10 
14 MOBIL OIL 6.00 0.50 6.00 1.00 0.13 0.47 
15 MRS NIG PLC 7.00 0.42 2.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
16 SEPLAT PETROLEUM 12.00 0.67 0.09 6.00 0.00 0.16 
17 OKUMU OIL 11.00 0.57 5.00 1.00 0.05 0.07 
18 NB PLC 17.00 0.52 6.00 0.00 0.12 0.57 
19 NIGERIAN ENAMEL WARES 
OIL 
7.00 0.57 5.00 0.00 0.03 1.35 
20 PZ CUSSONS NIG PLC 12.00 0.50 10.00 0.00 0.07 2.56 
21 GLAXCO SMITH KLINE 16.00 0.81 11.00 0.00 0.07 3.86 
22 TRIPPLE GEE 6.00 0.60 6.00 1.00 0.01 0.06 
23 PORTLAND PAINTS & 
PRODUCT PLC 
6.00 0.83 5.00 0.00 0.06 0.37 
24 ALUMINIUM EXT. IND PLC 7.00 0.71 17.00 0.01 0.09 1.54 
25 ACADEMY PRESS PLC 9.00 0.55 3.00 0.00 0.03 0.40 
26 RED STAR EXPRESS PLC 7.00 0.57 2.00 0.00 0.12 1.36 
27 ZENITH BANK PLC 12.00 0.58 2.00 0.00 0.03 6.32 
28 UBA PLC 17.00 0.58 2.00 0.00 0.02 2.90 
29 ACCESS BANK PLC 16.00 0.56 3.00 0.00 0.02 2.40 
30 NIGER INSURANCE PLC 9.00 0.66 4.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 
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The descriptive statistics of the data collected, showing the mean and standard deviations of study 
variables, is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 N MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STD. DEVIATION 
B SIZE 30 6.00 17.00 9.9333 3.52267 
BIND 30 .13 .83 .5720 .14940 
CEO TENURE 30 1.00 25 5.9000 5.33272 
CEO DUAL 30 .00 1.00 .1667 .37905 
ROA  30 -.01 .20 .0557 .04651 
ROE 30 -.02 6.32 .9443 1.44856 
   Source: Researcher’s Analysis  
The result of the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 shows the mean of board size of selected listed 
companies in the year of study was 9.9333 (approximately 10 members), with a standard deviation of 
3.52267. The mean of board Independence shows that approximately 60% (.5720) of board members in 
the listed selected companies are Independent Directors, and the Board Independence (BIND) has a 
standard deviation of .14940. On the other hand, the mean of CEO Tenure (CEO TENURE) was 5.9000 or 
(approximately 6 years), with a standard deviation of 5.33272. The result (Table 2) shows that on the 
average Chief Executive officers (CEO) of selected listed companies serves an average of 6 years in their 
position as CEOs. The descriptive statistics (Table 2) for CEO Duality shows that out of the thirty (30) listed 
companies used for the study, only five (5) have functions of both Chairman and CEO carried out by the 
same person. The mean of CEO Duality was .1667, with a standard deviation of .37905. The performance 
variable (ROA) indicated a mean of .0557 or 5.57%, with a standard deviation of .04651. On the average, 
the selected companies made a return of 5.57% from assets employed for their operations. The return on 
earnings (ROE) of the selected companies was .9443 or (approximately 9%), with a standard deviation of 
1.44856. This implies that on the average, the selected companies return about 9% of earnings to their 
shareholders. 
Correlation Analysis 
The relation between characteristics of corporate governance and performance variables were evaluated 
with Pearson’s correlation coefficient analysis. Correlations are significant at the level of 0.05 (2-tailed). A 
high positive correlation indicates that variables being considered have a positive relationship; while a 
negative correlation shows that there is negative relationship between the variables. The correlation 
coefficients show the degree of the relationship between variables, which may be positive or negative. The 
range is between – 1.00 and +1.00 for negative and positive values respectively; and no relationship if the 
value of the variables is 0.00. Table 4 shows the result of correlations analysis of B SIZE and ROA; and 
Table 5 shows the result of correlations analysis of B SIZE and ROE. 
 
Table 4: Correlations between ‘B SIZE’ and ‘ROA’ 
 B SIZE ROA 
B SIZE       Pearson correlation Coefficient  
                                              Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                               N               
1 
 
30 
-.014 
. 940 
30 
ROA                       Correlation Coefficient  
                                              Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                              N 
-.014 
.940 
30 
1 
 
30 
 *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
  Source: Researcher’s Analysis  
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Table 5: Correlations between ‘B SIZE’ and ‘ROE’ 
 B SIZE ROE 
 B SIZE       Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                             Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                             N  
1 
 
30 
.434* 
. 016 
30 
ROE                          Correlation Coefficient  
                                             Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                             N 
.434* 
.016 
30 
1 
 
30 
 *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
  Source: Researcher’s Analysis  
The correlation coefficient between Board size (B SIZE), ROA and ROE was -.014 and .434 respectively 
with a significance level of .940 and .016 for RAO and ROE. This correlation coefficient result of B SIZE 
with both performance variables indicates the existence of a negative relationship between B SIZE and 
ROA with a high significance of .940. This suggests that a positive relationship does not exist between 
board size (B SIZE) and return on asset (ROA) in companies used for the study. Conversely, board size (B 
SIZE) is positively related to returns on earnings (ROE) in companies used for the study.  
Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1 Testing 
The hypothesis 1 formulated in section 1 is stated below. 
Ho: Board Independence is not positively related to performance of companies in Nigeria. 
H1: Board Independence is positively related to performance of companies in Nigeria. 
The hypothesis is validated by ascertaining the relationship between ‘board independence’ and 
performance variables which are return on asset (ROA) and return on earnings (ROE). The result of 
hypotheesis 1 testing is shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Correlations - BIND: ROA, ROE 
 BIND ROA 
 BIND      Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                N 
1 
 
30 
.188 
. 320 
30 
                 ROA Correlation Coefficient  
                                                Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                N 
.188 
.320 
30 
1 
 
30 
 BIND ROE 
BIND       Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                N  
1 
 
30 
.231 
. 219 
30 
                 ROE Correlation Coefficient  
                                                Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                N 
.231 
.219 
30 
1 
 
30 
   Source: Researcher’s Analysis 
 
The result of Pearson correlation coefficient of Board Independence (BIND) on Return on Asset (ROA) was 
.188 which indicates a positive relationship these variables, with a significance of .320. Likewise, the 
correlation coefficient between board Independence (BIND) and Return on Earnings (ROE) was .231 which 
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also indicate a positive relationship these variables, with a significance of .219. Positive correlations 
between these two sets of variables (that is between Board Independence on Return on Asset; and board 
Independence and Return on Earnings) with significance values of .320 and .219 respectively which are 
higher than 0.05 (2 – tailed) value. The implies that there is a positive relationship between board 
independence and organisational performance in the selected listed companies. Hence, we reject the null 
hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (H1) which states that: ‘Board independence is 
positively related to performance of companies in Nigeria’. This position positively relating board 
independence with the performance was validated by previous studies (Faatihah et al., 2016; Todorovic, 
2013; Dwivedi, 2012; Haniffa and Hudaib; 2006). It has, however, been argued that emphasis should be 
more on experience and entrepreneurial skill when deciding the number of independent directors on a 
board (Heenatigala, 2011; Lipman, 2007; Petra, 2005; Laing and Weir, 1999).  
Hypothesis 2 Testing 
The hypothesis 2 formulated in section 1 is stated below. 
Ho: Chief Executive Officer’s tenure is negatively related to organisational performance. 
H1: Chief Executive Officer’s tenure is positively related to organisational performance. 
The hypothesis is validated by ascertaining the relationship between ‘CEO tenure’ and performance 
variables which are return on asset (ROA) and return on earnings (ROE). The result of hypothesis 2 testing 
is shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Correlations - CEO TENURE: ROA, ROE 
 CEO 
TENURE 
ROA 
 CEO TENURE       Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                               Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                               N 
1 
 
30 
-.213 
.258 
30 
                                 ROA Correlation Coefficient  
                                                               Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                               N 
-.213 
.258 
30 
1 
 
30 
 CEOTENURE ROE 
 CEO TENURE       Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                              Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                              N  
1 
 
30 
-.087 
. 646 
30 
                                 ROE Correlation Coefficient  
                                                              Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                              N 
-.087 
.646 
30 
1 
 
30 
   Source: Researcher’s Analysis  
 
The result of correlation coefficient of CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) and Return on Assets (ROA) was 
negative (-.213).  Also, the correlation coefficient of CEO tenure (CEO TENURE) and Returns on Earnings 
(ROE) was negative (-.087). Both result show significant negative relationships of .258 and .646 for return 
on asset (ROA) and return on earnings (ROE) respectively. This means that a reduced tenure for CEO in 
the selected companies impact positively their companies’ performance. This negative correlation value is 
an indication that these two sets of variables have an inverse relationship. Consequently, CEO tenure is 
inversely related to organisational performance. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) which states that: ‘Chief Executive Officer’s tenure is positively related to 
organisational performance’. 
Hypothesis 3 Testing 
The hypothesis 3 formulated in section 1 is stated below. 
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Ho: There is no positive relationship between performance of companies’ and dual role of Chief Executive 
Officers in Nigeria. 
H1: There is positive relationship between performance of companies’ and dual role of Chief Executive 
Officers in Nigeria. 
 
The hypothesis is validated by ascertaining the relationship between ‘dual role of CEO’ (CEO DUAL) and 
performance variables which are return on asset (ROA) and return on earnings (ROE). The result of 
hypothesis 3 testing is shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Correlations - CEO DUAL: ROA, ROE 
 CEO 
DUAL 
ROA 
CEODUAL        Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                          Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                          N 
1 
 
30 
.081 
.669 
30 
                           ROA Correlation Coefficient 
                                                          Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                          N  
.081 
.669 
30 
1 
 
30 
                
                                      
 
CEODUAL 
 
 
ROE 
 
 CEODUAL       Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
                                                         Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                         N  
1 
- 
30 
-.153 
.419 
30 
                           ROE Correlation Coefficient 
                                                         Sig. (2 tailed)  
                                                         N  
-.153 
.419 
30 
1 
 
30 
   Source: Researcher’s Analysis 
  
The result of correlation coefficient of CEO Duality is positively related to return on assets (ROA) with .081 
and a significance of .669. However, CEO Duality has a negative correlation of -.153 with returns on 
earnings (ROE), and a significance of .419. This implies that the differentiation of CEO and Board 
Chairman’s roles is positively related to organisational performance. This result is consistent with that of 
previous studies which affirmed that separation of CEO and Board Chairman position/role positively impact 
on organisational performance (Faatihah et al., 2016; Todorovic, 2013; Dwivedi, 2012; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). 
Conclusions 
The study has explored the effect of corporate governance practices on organisational performance, using 
thirty randomly selected listed companies in the Nigeria Stock Exchange in the year 2016. Analysis of data 
collected revealed a positive correlation between board size, independence directors, and performance 
variables; but, showed a negative correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables. Generally, 
the study revealed that adoption of sound corporate governance practices by listed companies can improve 
their performance. Companies can benefit from this improved corporate governance practices by way of 
increased investment from investors and reduced capital cost. Shareholders confidence would be 
enhanced with attendant improvement in shareholders wealth. The nation’s economy would also benefit 
from sound corporate governance practices by way of improved GDP.  
The result of the study revealed that listed companies’ in Nigeria observe sound governance practices in 
relation to Board Size, Independent Directors Proportion, CEO Tenure and CEO Duality had improved 
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performance. The result indicated that corporate governance variables are positively related to 
performance except for the board characteristic regarding CEO Tenure. Regarding relationship between 
board size and performance, the result indicated that number of directors was not positively related to 
performance in selected quoted companies in the Nigeria Stock Exchange in terms of returns on asset 
(ROA). However, the result revealed a positive correlation between board size and performance in terms of 
equity return (ROE). Although, the governance code of 2011 in Nigeria prescribed a board size of 5 
members; but, the result showed that the mean of ten (10) Board Size for selected listed companies. 
Meanwhile, both small and large board size have their advantages and disadvantages. Large boards have 
the advantage of robust and pool of experts for quality board decisions; with disadvantage of huge financial 
burdens on the firm. Conversely, small boards have the advantage of quicker decisions; with 
disadvantages of the dearth of expertise and skills to draw from. It is, therefore, essential for a company to 
constitute its board based on its peculiarities and objectives. 
Concerning relationship between board independence and performance, board independence 
characteristic showed a positive association with returns on asset and equity of selected listed companies 
in the Nigeria Stock Exchange. This result is corroborated by agency theory which lends credence to the 
influence of external director’s responsibility to the shareholders. Moreover, board independence is strongly 
advocated globally. The implication for practice is that performance of a company can be enhanced by 
having a high ratio of independent directors on its boards, thereby increasing the confidence of investors in 
the organisation. Regarding relationship between CEO Tenure and performance variables (ROA and 
ROE), the correlation between CEO tenure and performance variables of selected listed companies was 
negative on the two performance variables of return on asset (ROA) and return on earnings (ROE). The 
tenure of a CEO is impacted by his or her ability to improve the fortune of the company by creating value 
for the shareholders within a reasonable period. The implication of this for practice is that an organisation 
stands to benefit during the tenure of an effective and productive CEO who positively impact performance 
and increase investor’s confidence. 
Concerning relationship between CEO Duality and performance variables (ROA and ROE), the result 
showed that CEO Duality has a positive correlation with return on assets (ROA); but had a negative 
relationship with returns on earnings (ROE). The separation of the leadership of a firm is validated by 
agency theory which emphasises transparency and accountability of Board in dealing with the shareholders 
of the company. Specifically, the study revealed that 83% of selected NSE listed companies have adopted 
the recommendation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) code on non-combination or 
seperation of the role of CEO and chairman of a company. This is a good development for improvement of 
corporate governance in NSE and Nigeria. The implication for practice is that seperation of a company’s 
CEO and chairman role is beneficial because expertise, experience and skill of both individuals can induce 
improvement and enhance performance of the organisation. Moreover, CEO Duality contravenes the 
principle of agency theory as an individual have the absolute power of formulating, monitoring and 
implementing the company’s policies. 
Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendation are put forward: 
I. Quoted companies in Nigeria should have a high ratio of independent directors on their boards. 
This would increase the confidence of potential investors in the companies.  
II. Positions of a company’s CEOs and chairman should be occupied by different individuals. This 
would improve the company’s performance based on expertise, experience and skill of both 
individuals. 
III. Considering limitations of the study in terms of sample size and variables used, it is 
recommended that future studies may cover market measurement variable of Tobin’s Q to 
evaluate the impact on companies share prices. 
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